1.1 Roots of the Crisis: 1.1 Roots of the Crisis: The Financial System (II) The Financial System (II)
• An oversized financial sector (rent-seeking and policy capture, Simon Johnson)
• Banking performs an essential public utility function; they can do much good, but can also do much harm…
• Excessive trading (much of big banks' profits come from trading, which is an incentive to speculate)
• A crisis of deep financial integration; we no longer distinguish what is sovereign vs. private debt (financial industry)…huge moral hazard 1.2 Sub 1.2 Sub --optimality of EMU and optimality of EMU and N N --best Institutional Arrangements best Institutional Arrangements (flawed design) (flawed design)
• A flawed design : the lack of a lender of last resort and inadequate dealing with asymmetric shocks
•The EMU is not an "optimal currency area"
•Lack of convergence (Mezzogiornification in the EMU);
•One size fits all monetary policy has encouraged boom and bust cycles (resource allocation);
•Massive cross-border operations: interconnectedness • Zero sum games in the world economy?
• From a failed Lisbon Agenda…toward Europe 2020
• National policies do matter, but so do EU institutional arrangements and policies 2. Lessons of the Crisis and 2. Lessons of the Crisis and debunking debunking cliches cliches (I) (I)
• Low inflation is not sufficient for financial stability • Not all sovereign debt crises have a fiscal origin (Ireland, Spain, etc) • Financial/economic stability is linked with dynamics of private sector debt (the Asian crisis was a harbinger of this crisis…); systemic risks entail rescue operations that burden public debt
• The critical role of the financial sector for overall economic stability (Ireland, UK: overexpansion of banks; Spain and banks' poor lending (Cajas)
• Inter-connectedness has diminished the "robustness" of our systems (Andrew Haldane, Lamfalussy)….look how difficult it is to ring fence, whether a financial entity or a country (in the EMU in particular)…;
• The intensity of contagion effects in the EMU (the fear of a disorderly sovereign debt restructuring…a Lehman Brothers syndrome;
Lessons of the Crisis (II) Lessons of the Crisis (II)
• When black swans proliferate and uncertainty is on the rise it is less clear what makes up a sound (prudent) budget policy (Pisani Ferry: deterministic governance does not work in a stochastic world); can a country run big primary surpluses in "normal" times as a buffer against "extraordinary" times? • The "Great Moderation" (Great Misperception) was highly misleading: markets discriminate now among EMU member states via bond spreads (P. de Grauwe: the sovereign debt default mechanism makes the EMU more prone to crises since it introduces speculative dynamics into it…an analogy with the ERM);
• The role of external debt (vs. internal public debt): governments cannot tax non-resident holders of their bonds; • Size, competitiveness, size of public debt, range of tools (in and out of the euro zone), market rigidities, industrial relations, exposure, etc (resilience) • Poor regulation and supervision of financial markets entails major systemic risks • Deep financial integration collides with the reality of national prerogatives;
2. Lessons of the Crisis (III) 2. Lessons of the Crisis (III)
• Captivity of governments (too big to fail syndrome)
• Rediscovering sovereign debt risk in mature economies
• Poor coordination tools;
• The role of externalities in the EU (as in the global economy/US; quantitative easing…);
• The importance of trust • The reform of EU economic governance, the Euro pact+ the fiscal issue; internal imbalances; R&S of financial markets; policy coordination (the Economic Semester); strengthened institutions; a crisis management mechanism;
• A missing link: addressing insufficient convergence in the EU and EU level policies ("shock-absorbers"; resolution schemes, etc)
• Inter-governmental vs. community method;
• Global reform (G20, the FSB): reform of the R&S of financial markets. 3.2 Crisis management (I)
• Liquidity vs. solvency crisis;
• The inescapable ECB' s role as lender of last resort; from monetary to fiscal dominance in its conduct…
• The EFSF is weak, ineffective;
• Bailing in the private sector makes sense, but it foments contagion…
• The EFSF/ESM does not stop speculative dynamics (de Grauwe). It turns the impossible combination "no bail out, no default, no exit" into another one: "default, persistent imbalances, lack of fiscal union"
Crisis management (II)
• How realistic are adjustments programs in southern member states?
• Can debt restructuring be avoided?
• The ESM can hardly tackle the systemic risks posed by major financial groups (are higher capital and liquidity requirements the answer?) • The deleveraging issue in a period of slow growth ("the new normalcy") • What to do about the "too big to fail"? Anti-trust and Glass-Steagall type legislation (Volcker rules…) • The technocratic moment as a response to the confidence crisis • Can crisis management be dissociated from repairing the EMU?
• Are we running out of time?
3.3 Controlling Imbalances: 3.3 Controlling Imbalances: Fiscal Discipline (I) Fiscal Discipline (I)
• Fiscal sustainability when shocks proliferate (the need for fiscal space/policy space);
• The data question (Eurostat; independent bodies);
• Sanctions; how automatic will they be?
• Responsibility and accountability for an adjustment program….the more EU institutions are involved the more vague this could become…(a legitimacy issue);
• For countries with poor institutions, however, the involvement of EU institutions could be a bonus. In addition, it can help policy coordination.
3.3 Fiscal Discipline; 3.3 Fiscal Discipline; NMSs NMSs (II) (II)
• The case of hidden deficits;
• When structural fiscal deficits are quite high fiscal consolidation can hardly be put off;
• The role of EU funds in averting pro-cyclicality
• Except Hungary ( 80% of GDP) NMSs have low public debts owing to a decade of high economic growth and higher inflation;
• But for some of NMSs, resource allocation geared toward non-tradables has revealed a flawed growth model, that needs repair: double digit current account deficits in the pre-crisis years turned into high budget deficits in the wake of this crisis and fiscal consolidation can not be put off;
Internal Imbalances in the EMU Internal Imbalances in the EMU
• Not all tensions are rooted in fiscal profligacy;
• Competitiveness gaps (CA deficits: "Excessive Imbalance Procedure" (EIP)…analogous with the EDP;
• Which indicators?
• How will corrections be applied? Will surplus countries be also involved in undertaking corrections?
• What about NMSs that need capital imports for catching up?
• Which tools for making corrections? Is wage control sufficient? (could we have a race to the bottom here….a sort of competitive wage control…)
• How realistic is internal devaluation over a longer period of time?
• Correcting external (CA) deficits wouldn't it imply a restriction on capital flows?
The Economic Semester (ES) The Economic Semester (ES) (Policy Coordination) (I) (Policy Coordination) (I)
• Macroeconomic and financial stability (ESRB) concerns will be internalized;
• National budgetary framework: multi-annual programming; transparency and predictability; compatibility with the new rules of the SGP;
• Internalizing policy recommendations of the EU institutions would be an issue (in order to avoid a new fact of a democratic deficit); an ownership problem… (apart from intellectual mastery)
• Where local institutions are weak ES can be an advantage… 3.5 3.5 Economic Semester Economic Semester : : a EMU/EU Finance Ministry? a EMU/EU Finance Ministry?
• Defining its mandate; would it be a EU fiscal watchdog and nothing else?
• If it deals with the R&S of financial markets how would it relate to the ESRB and the three authorities?
• What about overall EU economic governance? How would it relate to the Commission (Olie Rehn)?
• Would it have a say in defining the EU budget (structure and size)?
• Its dialogue with national ministries 15 CASE -Center for Social and Economic Research 3.6 R&S of Financial Markets 3.6 R&S of Financial Markets
• Content: no financial entity be left out (HFs and PEFs); limit leverage; higher capital and liquidity requirements; derivatives; remuneration; accounting standards (fair value vs. book value); rating agencies; regulatory arbitrage; restrict naked short selling ; protection of consumers, etc.
• Taxing the industry (feed a stabilization fund);
• "Too big to fail": apply anti-trust legislation (Volcker rules) • Ring-fencing retail banking (Vickers commission)
• Go global with reform (FSB, G20, etc) • Real convergence vs. nominal convergence criteria
• Fulfilling the OCA criteria ex ante (the thesis that financial integration would foster convergence in the EMU is not validated…)
• Competitiveness is a key concept
• Some non euro zone NMSs fit better the demands of the OCA than some current EMU member states • The need for policy space
